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Central banks are among the most powerful institutions in the world: they are granted a 
legal monopoly in the issuance of money, set interest rates, monitor the banking sector 
and generally control a country’s money supply and monetary policy. Their decisions 
and actions affect directly or indirectly almost every economic activity on the planet. 
However, most of these institutions decide and act independently from government, they 
are managed by appointed rather than democratically-elected officials and these officials 
usually come from the private banking sector. These facts generate questions about the 
functionality of the system and its efficiency in managing global finance. The goal of 
this research is to investigate the status of central bank management and ownership 
across the world today, and examine both philosophically and ethically the arguments for 
and against central bank independence in modern democracies. The analysis concludes 
that modern democracies should reassess the structure of central banking and address 
methods and practices that could possibly jeopardize economic development and the 
effective functioning of democracy in the long run. Empty 10 
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1    Introduction 
The goal of this research is to investigate the status of central bank management and 
ownership across the world today and examine both philosophically and ethically the 
arguments for and against central bank independence in modern democracies. The research 
starts with a short literature review about the history of central banks, their goals and 
functions, ownership status, independence from government, accountability and transparency 
rules. Next is an outline of the methodology that is applied in the research. The analysis part 
includes the results of the primary research and critical analyses of central banks’ ownership 
structure and independence. In the last part of the study there is a summary of the 
conclusions. 
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2    Literature Review 
2.1      History of Central Banks 
The history of central banking goes back to the 17th century, to the founding of the Swedish 
Riksbank. The Riksbank was established in 1668 as a joint stock bank in order to lend 
government funds and to act as a clearing house for commerce (Moenjak, 2014). A few 
decades later, in 1694, the most famous central bank of the era, the Bank of England, was 
founded also as a joint stock company to purchase government debt. Some authors argue that 
the modern-day notion of central banking should be dated from the 1844 Act, when the Bank 
of England received a monopoly on the issue of banknotes (e.g. Davies and Green, 2010). 
Other central banks were set up later in Europe for similar purposes. For example, the Banque 
de France was established in 1800 by Napoleon to stabilize the currency after the French 
Revolution and to aid in government finance. The other main European central banks took on 
these responsibilities in the last decades of the 19th century. An analytical outline of central 
banking institutions before 1900 can be found in Capie et al (1994). The number of central 
banks increased rapidly in the 20th century, with the establishment of 143 new institutions 
between 1900 and 1990 (Pringle and Mahate, 1993). The U.S. had two central banks in the 
early nineteenth century, the 1st (1791–1811) and 2nd (1816 to 1836) Bank of the United 
States. Both were set up on the model of the Bank of England, but their charters were not 
renewed due to concerns about concentration of power (Bordo, 2017). The Federal Reserve 
System was created much later, in 1913, and it belongs to a later wave of central banks, which 
emerged at the turn of the 20th century with the goal of providing financial stability. Today 
there are more than 180 central banks or monetary authorities around the world. 
2.2      Aims of Central Banks 
Central banks were initially created in order to issue currency and provide banking services to 
governments. While these early central banks helped fund government debt, they were also 
engaged in banking activities. Since they held the deposits of other banks, they came to serve 
as “banks for bankers”, facilitating transactions between them. Because of their large reserves 
they also became the lender of last resort in periods of financial crises (Bordo, 2017). Their 
aims also involved currency management and the holding of gold reserves. After World War 
II, their objectives were extended to include high levels of employment and growth (Capie et 
al, 1994). 
In a recent study, carried out in 2006, researchers Friseld, Roszbach and Spagnolo from 
the Swedish Riksbank asked forty-seven central banks how they perceived their objectives. 
Around half responded that price stability was their primary objective (46%). Other objectives 
included preserving the value of the currency (13%), providing efficient payment mechanisms 
(6%), preserving the purchasing power of domestic currency (4%), guiding banking 
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operations (2%), monetary stability (2%) and other more complex objectives (27%). It must 
be mentioned that many central banks have high employment and economic growth as basic 
targets set by law. The specific set of goals that each central bank is trying to achieve is 
defined by national legislation and this has been named the target variable. The means that 
central banks use in order to achieve these targets have been named the instrument variable 
(Davies and Green, 2010). The main instruments that a central bank can use to achieve its 
goals are the following (McDonell and Brue, 2008; Mankiw, 2009): Open-market operations, 
meaning the buying and selling of government bonds, the reserve ratio, meaning the portion 
of depositors' balances that commercial banks must have on hand as cash and the discount 
rate, meaning the interest rate that the central bank charges to commercial banks. 
2.3      Functions of Central Banks 
Economists and central bankers have tried to come up with a satisfactory list of central 
banking functions. De Kock (1974) mentions that the 10 main functions of central banks are: 
1. Monopoly of note issue; 2. Banker and adviser to the government; 3. Act as the custodian 
of cash reserves of commercial banks; 4. Act as a lender of the last resort; 5. Control the 
credit of the country; 6. Maintenance and management of foreign exchange rate; 7.Clearing 
house facilities; 8. Publication of statistical data and other useful information; 9. Keep and 
manage foreign exchange reserves of the country; 10.Control fluctuations in order to curb 
inflation. In 1983, an IMF paper authored by Collyns, offered a list of the functions of a 
central bank, categorizing them in 5 areas: 1. currency issue and foreign exchange reserve 
management; 2. banker to the government; 3. banker to commercial banks; 4. regulation of 
the financial system; and 5. monetary and credit policy.  
In a more recent attempt, Singleton (2011) listed the following 10 basic central bank 
functions: 1. Issuing legal tender banknotes and coinage; 2. Implementing and formulating 
monetary policy; 3. Providing banking and agency services for the government, and often 
manage the public debt; 4. Keeping cash reserves of commercial banks and assisting in the 
settlement of clearance balances between them; 5. Supervising and regulating the financial 
system, and in some circumstances acting as a lender of last resort; 6. Applying government 
policy on the exchange rate and keeping the national reserves of international currency; 7. 
Promoting economic development; 8. Advising governments on economic policy; 9. 
Participating in cooperative international monetary arrangements; 10. Other functions such 
as the provision of banking services to the public, consumer protection or the part ownership 
of a stock exchange. The functions of course may vary both between countries and within the 
same country over time. What is clear, in any case, is that central banks are very powerful 
institutions and that their role is of enormous importance in most economies and countries 
around the world today.  
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2.4       Ownership 
Regarding the issue of ownership, one would imagine that all central banks across the world 
are state owned institutions. However this is not always the case. Many central banks, 
especially the oldest ones, like the Bank of England, began as private sector companies; 
others started as public-sector agencies, like the Federal Reserve Board. The great majority 
are now state owned, though partial private ownership persists in a few cases. A research by 
the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) in 2009 in a sample of 47 central banks, 
concluded that 77% were fully owned by the state or the public sector, 11% were majority or 
half owned by state or public sector, 4% were majority owned by the private sector and 1% 
had some other mixed ownership form. As examples of central banks with private ownership, 
the BIS research mentions: 
• Belgium, South Africa and Turkey, where part or all of the shares of the central bank’s 
capital are publicly listed and available for purchase by private individuals, 
• the US Federal Reserve System and the Swiss National Bank, which have a mixed 
public/private ownership structure that is specified by law, 1 
• Belgium, Greece and Italy which have central banks partly or wholly owned by private 
sector shareholders.  
The development of the ownership structures of central banks is also recorded in the book by 
De Kock (1974). More recently Rossouw (2014) noted that on 2004 central banks with 
shareholders were to be found in Austria, Belgium, Greece, Italy, Japan, South Africa, 
Switzerland and Turkey, while the 12 Federal Reserve Banks in United States also have 
shareholders. However the central bank of Austria was nationalised in 2010, leaving the 
remaining as central banks with private shareholders. 
2.5       Independence 
A very contentious aspect of central banking that has appeared along with the development of 
central banks is central bank independence from government. Central bank independence 
(CBI) refers to the freedom of central bankers from direct political or governmental influence 
in the conduct of policy (Walsh, 2005). CBI is considered to have two key dimensions: 
“political independence” meaning independence from political influence in defining its policy 
objectives, and “economic independence”, meaning independence in the choice of policies in 
pursuit of monetary policy goals (Grilli et al, 1991). Debelle and Fischer (1994) named these 
two aspects “goal independence” and “instrument independence”. Goal independence refers 
                                                 
1 The Swiss National Bank is a company subject to the law governing joint stock companies, but its 
officials are subject to legislation that governs the behaviour of federal authorities (BIS, 2009, 
p.64).The Swiss Bank’s shares are traded on the Swiss stock exchange. 
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to a central bank’s ability to determine policy goals without the direct influence of a fiscal 
authority, while instrument independence refers to the central bank’s ability to freely adjust 
its policy tools in pursuit of monetary policy goals. The BIS (2009) determines the degree of a 
central bank’s autonomy by 4 elements: 1. Clear and non-contradictory mandates; 2. Limited 
relationship to the state and no obligation to finance government activities; 3. Power to make 
policy decisions; 4. Appointment process and the term limits for its officers can be made by 
the state, but afterwards officials must be insulated from political influence. 
It is astonishing, however, that in all the relevant literature there is only one main 
theoretical argument in favour of central bank independence: political interference on 
monetary policy and the time-inconsistency problem. For example authors like Lastra (2006); 
Abel et al (2008); McConnell and Brue (2008) mention that independent central banks can be 
insulated from political pressures to pursue overly expansionary policies. In order to get re-
elected or satisfy the general public, politicians may be tempted to increase spending and 
create inflation in the long run. It is claimed that a politically insulated central bank is more 
likely to be concerned with long-run objectives and be a better defender of price stability. 
Another argument found on the literature is related with the possible discipline that 
independent central banks may exert on fiscal policies and budget deficits. Various authors 
have tested this relationship and some found no relationship (e.g. Sikken & Haan, 1998), 
while others found a negative one (e.g. Masciandaro & Tabellini, 1988; Bodea, 2013; 
Burdekin & Laney, 2016). 
The counterargument to central bank independence is that this practice is inconsistent with 
democratic principles. Having monetary policy controlled by an elite group of policy makers 
that are insulated from elected politicians can be undemocratic and risky for the general 
public (Mishkin, 2012; Cecchetti and Schoenholtz, 2015; Wood, 2015). Other arguments arise 
from independent central bank failures, like the period of Great Inflation in the U.S. and the 
recent financial crisis. All these arguments will be analysed in more detail later on this article.  
Today the reality is that many central banks around the world are, legally at least, 
independent from government. An example is the European Central Bank (ECB), which 
mentions in its website: “Neither the ECB nor the national central banks (NCBs), nor any 
member of their decision-making bodies, are allowed to seek or take instructions from EU 
institutions or bodies, from any government of an EU Member State or from any other body”. 
Granting central bank independence is also a prerequisite for membership in the Eurosystem. 
Other examples include the Bank of England that gained operational independence with a 
Labour Act on 1997, the Bank of Japan on 1998, while the Fed has enjoyed a high degree of 
insulation from political interference since 1951. 
Empirical research has been carried out in relation to CBI and its effect on monetary 
policy. The most widely employed  index of central bank independence is due to Cukierman, 
Webb, and Neyapti (1992), although alternative measures were developed by Bade and 
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Parkin (1978), Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini (1991), Dinchen & Eichengreen (2014) and 
others. Several authors including Alesina (1988); Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini (1991); 
Cukierman et al (1992); Jonsson, (1995) and Eijffinger et al (1998) found that more 
independent central banks were associated with lower levels of inflation. Alesina and 
Summers (1993) however could not find any correlation between CBI and real economic 
performance. However, the empirical work attributing low inflation to central bank 
independence has been criticized on the basis that these researches may fail to measure other 
factors that affect inflation. For example Campillo and Miron (1997) found little role for 
central bank independence, after controlling for other potential determinants of inflation. 
Moreover, by comparing the implementation dates of CBI reforms with long-term inflation 
trends for 29 OECD countries, Daunfeldt and de Luna (2008) found that price stability had 
been achieved in most countries before their central banks became more independent. 
2.6      Transparency  
The method that modern democracies have used in order to control the vast amount of power 
that they have granted to independent central banks is through accountability and 
transparency rules. Kaltenthaler et al (2010) refer to central bank accountability as the ability 
of the governed to know the reasoning behind policy decisions, reward or punish policy-
makers and have the power to remove them when their decisions don’t reflect citizens’ 
preferences for policy outcomes. Transparency is also a very important element of 
accountability (Eijffinger and Hoeberichts, 2002). Whatever arrangements concerning 
democratic accountability may exist, their scope is limited without transparency and the 
availability of information about a central bank’s decisions and policies. Siklos (2012) in his 
book explains the importance of communication for creating trust to the general public for the 
central bank’s actions and decisions. A good example is the Reserve Bank of New Zealand 
(RBNZ), which in 1990 became the first central bank to adopt inflation targeting as a 
monetary policy regime, while putting great emphasis on transparency and accountability 
(Moejnak, 2014). There are public announcements of inflation targets and the reasoning 
behind changes in the interest rate, and accountability is conveyed through the fact that if the 
inflation target is missed without a good explanation, the RBNZ governor can be removed. 
This emphasis on transparency and accountability helped enhance the RBNZ’s credibility in 
its conduct of monetary policy. On the contrary, the European Central Bank (ECB) is 
considered to be one of the most independent central banks in the world (Arnone et al, 2007), 
and also one of the less transparent in comparison with other central banks (Davies and 
Green, 2010). Legal accountability of the G7 central banks have been compared in a research 
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by Eijffinger and De Haan (1996) and large differences have been observed from country to 
country. 
2.7 Goals of the Research 
Keeping in mind the long history of central banking, the very important role of monetary 
policy, the vast amount of power that central banks are controlling today and the extensive 
literature on the topic, there is a number of important questions that arise: Should central 
banks be privately or state owned? Should they operate independently from democratically 
elected governments? Is that the optimal way to provide financial and monetary stability and 
economic growth? Are transparency and accountability the methods for ensuring that a 
central bank’s decisions will coincide with the will of the general public? 
3    Methodology 
In order to answer these questions this research will apply a methodology which consists of 
three parts. Firstly, in order to collect updated information about the topics of central bank 
ownership and independence, the authors have contacted electronically, through e-mail, the 
76 central banks of the countries that are considered democratic according to the Economist 
Intelligence Unit’s (EIU) Democracy Index 2016. The Democracy Index intends to measure 
the state of democracy in 167 countries, of which 166 are sovereign states and 165 are UN 
member states. In addition to a numeric score and a ranking, the index categorises countries in 
one of four regime types: full democracies, flawed democracies, hybrid regimes and 
authoritarian regimes. Full democracies refers to countries with free and fair elections, 
political freedom, civil liberties, satisfactory functioning of government, independent media 
and independent judiciary system, while Flawed democracies are countries that share the 
above characteristics, but have significant weaknesses in other aspects of democracy, 
including problems in governance, an underdeveloped political culture and low levels of 
political participation. The number of full democracies for 2016 was 19 and of flawed 
democracies 57. The questions that were sent to central banks were 6 in total, and they 
regarded three topics – Ownership, Management and Independence. The exact questions were 
the following: 
A. Ownership 
1. Is the central bank in your country a state organization, a private company or a mixed 
ownership company (shares belonging to both the state and private shareholders)? 
2. In case it is a private or a mixed ownership company, are the shareholders published? 
Review of Economic Analysis 11 (2019) 233-254 
 240
B. Management 
3. How is the central bank’s governing board selected?  
4. Are they elected (from national elections) or appointed officials? 
C. Independence 
5. Is the central bank independent from government by law?  
6. If yes, how is transparency for the central bank’s decisions secured for the general 
public? 
The questions were short in order to try to increase the response rate, since it is very usual to 
have low response rates in central banks researches (Blinder et al, 2017). The emails were 
sent during the summer of 2017, from the 30th of July until the 1st of August and answers were 
expected until the 20th of August. A reminder in all central banks was sent on the 5th of 
August. 
Secondly, there is going to be a critical analysis of central bank ownership structure, based 
on the collected information, and thirdly there is going to be a critical analysis of the various 
arguments that have been put forward in favour and against central bank independence. The 
three parts of the analysis will hopefully provide some useful conclusions in the end. 
4    Results and Discussion 
4.1      Questionnaire Replies 
The response rate to the questionnaires was low, as only 17 central banks from the 76 
democratic countries replied. The sample was complemented with 2 central banks that the 
required information was easily accessible from their website, the Bank of Greece and the 
Federal Reserve, creating a total sample of 19 out of 76 central banks (25% response rate). 
A record of the received replies is presented in Appendix 1. From the central banks that 
replied 14 (73%), replied that they are state owned, and in 5 (27%) private individuals and 
organizations had whole or some share of the central bank’s capital. The central banks with 
private shareholders are listed in Table 1. Of these 5 central banks, the shareholders were 
directly or indirectly publicized in 4 of them, and only in the case of Greece the exact 
shareholders and their shares of capital are not officially publicized. Regarding the other 
questions, all of the 19 central banks (100%) answered that they are governed by appointed, 
non-elected (from general elections) officials. Also, all declared that they are independent 
from their government. Appendix 1 presents the central bank’s replies along with their score 
in the Dincer-Eichengreen (2014) independence index for 2010, whenever available. All 
banks have declared to use various effective transparency policies, including: reports, 
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publications, parliament auditions, press releases, speeches, conferences, seminars, statistical 
databases, multimedia content, website, contact facility etc. Additionally the Reserve Bank of 
Australia every year consults with the government in order to set targets.  
 
Table 1: Central banks in the sample with private shareholders  
No Country Central Bank Ownership Shareholders 
1 Switzerland Swiss National Bank 
Cantons and cantonal banks (52%) 
and private individuals (48%) Publicized 
2 Japan Bank of Japan 55% state and 45% private individuals Publicized 
3 United States 
Federal Reserve 
System 
Owned by commercial banks but 
profits over 6% are paid to the 
Treasury 
Publicized 
4 Italy Banca d' Italia 
Shares belong to a) Italian banks b) 
Italian insurance companies c) Italian 
foundations d) Italian social security, 
insurance bodies and pension funds. 
No shareholder may hold, directly or 
indirectly, a share of the capital 
greater than 3% 
Publicized 
5 Greece Bank of Greece 
State  8,93%,  State organizations, 
Social insurance funds, private 
individuals 91,07% ¹ 
Not directly 
publicized 
Note: The Bank of Greece released an announcement on 29/5/2012 that claimed that the Greek State 
indirectly controls about 70% of capital. Shareholders with share capital over 2%, apart from the 
Greek state, have no voting rights during general assemblies. 
4.2      Critical Analysis of Ownership Structure 
Most countries around the world have state owned central banks, with very few exceptions. 
What are the reasons for having a privately owned central bank? Are there any advantages or 
there is clear conflict with private ownership and the very important role that these 
institutions play for the general public? A basic argument in favour of private central bank 
ownership is that it is insulated from state control and political interference. According to the 
prevailing central bank theory, these may undermine the central bank’s ability to effectively 
choose and implement monetary policy. Perhaps also, private ownership structure assists in 
avoiding the complex and time consuming bureaucratic procedures that are required for state 
agencies, thus creating time savings and more flexible management structures. Moreover, the 
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BIS (2009) mentions that in cases of private ownership, all important policymaking powers 
are shielded from private shareholder influence and shareholders rarely have a say over 
financial arrangements, since financial and policy objectives can conflict. Roussow (2015) 
mentions that although private shareholders have no say over decisions about monetary 
policy, central banks report on these decisions to their shareholders, and this can be 
considered as an extra layer of control, that enhances governance, accountability and 
transparency. Furthermore, shareholding by commercial banks (as in the US and Italy) can 
provide an opportunity to assist commercial banks in financial distress, as was the case in 
Italy with the revaluation of the central bank  in 2014. Finally, as mentioned again by the BIS 
(2009), all in all, different ownership models do not appear to affect the performance of the 
main tasks of the central bank and are instead “mostly arrangements designed to satisfy local 
constitutional or practical needs” (p.65).  
On the other hand, as mentioned by Davies and Green (2010), central banks are clearly 
carrying out public objectives, so the case for private ownership is weak. Private shareholding 
can entail risks, as shareholders may challenge a central bank’s actions. Moreover, where the 
shares are quoted, there can be inconsistency between stock exchange reporting requirements 
and policy-driven restrictions on disclosure. The BIS (2009) mentions, as a negative side, that 
publicly listed shares can consume a significant amount of the central bank’s time and 
resources. In cases where the shareholders are not publicized, this can create distrust about the 
central bank’s ownership and goals. As mentioned by Roussow (2015), the Bank of Italy and 
the 12 US Federal Reserve Banks allow ownership to private banks. In this case there may be 
a supervisor-to-supervisee relationship, and there may be in some cases conflict between the 
interests of the general public and the actions of the shareholding private banks.  
Roussow (2014) also claims that central banks with private ownership are to a certain 
extent a relic of the past, given that this system of ownership was not adopted (with the 
exception of Pakistan) for central banks established after the 2nd World War. However the 
Central Bank of Pakistan was nationalised in 1975, while the most recent nationalisation was 
that of the central bank of Austria in 2010. Consequently there is a very small number of 
privately owned central banks left in the world, and in these countries the central bank’s 
ownership status should probably be a topic of public debate. 
4.3       Critical Analysis of Central Bank Independence 
Another important issue that should also be a matter of public debate is related with central 
bank independence. The largest economies of the world have granted some small or large 
degree of independence in central bankers. The main arguments that have been put forth in 
favour of central bank independence are the following: 
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A) Political Interference: As mentioned earlier, in all the extensive literature about central 
banking, surprisingly there is only one theoretical argument in favour of central bank 
independence: the possible negative consequences that irresponsible political interference can 
have on the money supply and inflation levels. If politicians choose to increase government 
spending in order to satisfy voters and get re-elected in the short run, this can have very 
negative effects on the price level in the long run. As explained better by Fischer (2015), the 
traditional economic case for CBI rests on countering inflationary biases that may occur in the 
absence of an independent central bank. One reason for such a bias is political pressure to 
boost output in the short run for electoral reasons. Another reason is the incentive for 
politicians to use the central bank’s power to issue money as a means to finance government 
spending. Another reason is related with the time‐inconsistency problem of monetary policy 
making, which can undermine the central bank’s credibility in keeping inflation low and 
create higher inflation expectations in the general public. By delegating monetary policy to an 
independent and conservative (i.e. inflation averse) central bank, promises to keep inflation 
low become more credible (Bernanke, 2010).  
The significance of central bank independence arises also from the different priorities 
between politicians and central bankers. Politicians are aware of the importance of price 
stability, but they tend to be less willing to sacrifice other goals, such as growth and 
employment, to the fight against inflation (Goodman, 1991). Central bankers tend to be more 
concerned with the risks of inflation for a variety of factors, of which the most significant 
appears to be the close ties between central banks and the financial community. Banks are 
highly averse to both unexpected inflation and market instability, as their long-term interests 
depend upon the central bank’s ability to control inflation. Moreover, Maxfield (1997) 
suggested that in some cases CBI reforms have been implemented, especially in less 
developed countries, to signal creditworthiness to foreign investors.  
B) Empirical Research: The belief about the negative relation of CBI with inflation levels is 
supported by empirical research. Much of it appeared in the 1980s in papers by Bade and 
Parkin (1984), Alesina (1988, 1989), Alesina and Summers (1993), Grilli et al (1991) and 
Alesina and Gatti (1995). By the late 1990s, the opinion that central bank independence 
improves monetary policy outcomes was also widespread in academic textbooks (Howells 
and Mariscal, 2006). Examples of more recent studies of the topic with similar results are 
those by Crowe and Meade (2008) and Anastasiou (2009).  
C) Transparency and Accountability: Concerns about the power issued to independent 
central banks and the effectiveness of their decisions have been addressed by various 
accountability and transparency mechanisms. As highlighted by Fisher (2016), a central 
bank's accountability is enforced by regular reporting on monetary policy actions and 
outcomes to the legislature, to the government and to the public. Accountability of the central 
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bank helps deal with the potential conflict between independence and the fact that unelected 
officials are determining policies critical to a country's economy. Eijffinger and Hoeberichts 
(2002) also stress the importance of transparency as a very important element of central bank 
accountability. They support that when the reasons for a certain monetary policy decision lay 
open, it is easier to make a judgement and to hold central bank officials accountable for their 
behaviour. So, a central bank should be required to report at regular intervals on its past 
performance and future plans for monetary policy in accordance with the monetary 
objectives. The authors also describe a variety of transparency procedures that are applied in 
various countries around the world, including central banks’ meetings minutes, reports, 
forecasts and audits. In addition, Howells and Mariscal (2006) mention several reasons why 
monetary policy might be improved by transparency. Firstly, transparency makes monetary 
policy more predictable in the short and medium run. Predictability contributes to market 
stability since it improves public understanding of the rules that govern central bank decision 
making and reduces uncertainty. Secondly, greater disclosure of the policy making process 
ensures that market expectations by the private sector can be formed more accurately and 
efficiently (Blinder et al, 2001).  
In contrast to the arguments mentioned in favour of CBI, there are many arguments that 
question and challenge the notion of central bank independence. Some of them are mentioned 
in the following paragraphs. 
A) Democratic Control: A main argument has to do with the democratic limits of 
independence for an institution that plays such an important role in every economy. If we 
accept that democracy is the best type of political system, and in a democracy everything 
should be controlled by the general public (or their elected officials in representative 
democracies), then monetary policy is just too important to be left in the hands of unelected 
individuals, that are able to exercise it as they like, and without any legal repercussions. This 
practice is clearly beyond democratic limits and raises questions about its purposefulness and 
effectiveness. 
Advocates of central bank independence also claim that independence is necessary to 
protect the economy from short-term political interference to increase the money supply, 
which can affect the price level in the long-run. Politicians are supposedly short sighted and 
don’t see the negative long term negative economic effects. Somebody could easily say that 
this argument actually has no logical basis. Politicians in reality make much tougher long-
term decisions, they are very well informed about the time consistency problem and are more 
than capable to comprehend the negative effects of inflation. The difference is that in well-
functioning democracies they do everything with the authorization and control of the public. 
If they make the wrong decisions, they can be hold accountable by law and the general public 
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in the following elections. In reality, all political decisions have long term effects, and there is 
no obvious reason why the time consistency argument is valid only for monetary purposes.  
Blinder (1998) believes it’s a mystery why governments have chosen the delegate such 
powers in independent central banks, and have not done so for example in tax policy. 
Moreover, often we meet independent authorities operating within states, but their operation 
is strictly defined by government laws, their effectiveness is regularly audited by the 
government and the general public, and of course there are legal repercussions when they 
surpass the legal framework under which they are supposed to operate. On the contrary 
central banks are in pursuit of, and have in some cases achieved, a much higher degree of 
autonomy. Friedman (1962, p. 228-229), while questioning the best arrangement for monetary 
policy, he mentions another three possible defects of independent central banks: a) dispersal 
of responsibility, which promotes shirking responsibility in times of uncertainty and 
difficulty, b) they are highly dependent on the personalities of central bankers and c) an 
independent central banks inevitably give undue emphasis to the point of view of bankers, 
especially regarding the credit market. 
B) Not Real Independence: Others might say that in reality most central banks only claim to 
be independent. They have been founded by laws voted by the government, they are 
responsible for the government’s banking activities, their governors are appointed by the 
government, their goals and tools are determined by the government, they are audited by the 
government and the government has the ability to change their legal charter whenever it 
seems fit. Also as correctly noted by Wray (2014), if a government decides to spend beyond 
budgeted amounts —perhaps in an attempt to replicate the experience of the Weimar 
Republic or Zimbabwe—the central bank would actually be powerless to prevent it. As 
Friedman (1962, p.227) puts it: Even when central banks have supposedly been fully 
independent, they have exercised their independence only so long as there has been no real 
conflict between them and the rest of the government”. Ben Bernanke, former Chairman of 
the United States Federal Reserve, during a Congress hearing on 2012, said it clearly: "of 
course we'll do whatever Congress tells us to do". However these views are not shared by all 
central bankers. The ECB for example has a much different perception and degree of 
autonomy. 
C) Role in the GFC: Other criticisms against CBI are related with independent central banks’ 
failures. Leaving aside the long history of independent central bank mistakes, like the 1970’s 
period of Great Inflation in the US, new criticisms against central bank independence have 
been put forward for their role in the recent Global Financial Crisis. It can be claimed that 
these institutions have a large portion of the blame for the outbreak of the financial crisis, 
since they are charged with the responsibility of securing financial stability. Steve Roach, 
former chief economist of Morgan Stanley, argued that the central banks bore the prime 
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responsibility for the crisis (2007), mentioning that: “the art and science of central banking is 
in desperate need of a major overhaul—before it’s too late”.  
Moreover, during the crisis central banks had to intervene at a grand scale to maintain 
financial stability. Blinder et al (2017) in an ECB report describe the actions that large central 
banks took in order to safeguard the stability of the financial system, “like lending to banks on 
a massive scale…or lending to nonbank financial institutions…or purchasing non‐traditional 
assets” (p.34) and stress the fact the these central banks have moved to the domain of fiscal 
policy. Fels (2016) also supports that many of the central banks’ decisions that are required to 
address today’s greatest problems have significant distributive consequences and are thus in 
the “realm of fiscal policy rather than monetary policy”. Other critiques about the role of 
central banks in the GFC can be found on Buitter (2008). In conclusion, apart from being 
responsible for the tolerance that created the recent GFC, independent central banks are 
taking fiscal decisions about how taxpayers’ money should be spend. 
D) Bonds with the Banking Sector: Other criticisms come from the close relationship that 
central bankers have with private banks. Many central bankers used to work for the private 
banks that they later had to supervise, and this can create conflicts of interest. The role of 
bankers in effecting politics and central banking, even though obvious, remains to be 
discussed publicly. In his book about the role of private banks in central banking and politics, 
Adolph (2016, p.2) mentions : “Arguably, no sector of the economy is more responsible for 
the economic crisis that began in 2007, yet no other sector has emerged more profitably, or 
with greater leverage over policy in the United States and Europe”. 
E) Distrust: Perhaps the relationship of central banks with private banks and politicians is the 
reason there is large citizen distrust towards central banks. According to Eurobarometer 
survey of public opinion 2017, only 34% of Europeans trust the European Central Bank 
(ECB), 17% don’t know it and 49% declared that they distrust it. The results of Karthenahel 
et al (2010) also confirm the feelings of distrust towards the ECB. According to the authors 
many Europeans are concerned that their voice or that of their country is not being heard in 
the ECB’s policy-making and this democratic deficit is damaging levels of support for the 
integration process as a whole. Distrust against central banks is common in other countries 
around the world also. In the US for example, a large portion of citizens, academics and 
politicians are questioning the Fed system’s functionality, especially in the aftermath of the 
GFC. 
F) Weaknesses of the Empirical Research: As mentioned earlier, central bank independence 
has been backed by empirical research that has claimed to prove the adverse relationship 
between CBI and inflation and was quickly accepted by academics and politicians. However 
this empirical research has been criticized for a number of reasons. Pollard (1993) 
summarizes the most important methodological weaknesses:  
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i) There is difficulty in measuring central bank independence. With few exceptions, most 
indexes apply equal weight to each factor and obviously a legal measure of independence 
may not reflect a bank's de facto level of independence. There also may be bias in the 
factors selected to measure independence.2  
ii) In most studies political factors that affect inflation are not included in the calculations.  
iii) Empirical use of these indexes may be problematic if CBI is an endogenous variable in 
the sense that countries with a commitment to price stability may have a greater propensity 
for independent central banks. If this is true, the establishment of an independent bank 
without a commitment to price stability will not bring inflation benefits.3  
Moreover, Cukierman (1992) and Bouwman et al. (2005) point out that legal indicators of 
CBI are often incomplete and unreliable because laws do not explicitly specify the limits of 
authority between CBs and governments. Thus, the actual degree of CBI may not be well 
measured by legal independence indicators.  
G) Accountability: Another source of criticism for central banks is related with the 
accountability mechanisms. If we consider as the central bank’s ultimate goal to safeguard the 
public’s interest, there should be appropriate responsibility mechanisms when this goal is not 
achieved. As noted by Davies and Green (2010), in the central bank context, accountability 
typically implies a duty to explain the reasons for decisions, after the event, and to answer 
questions on them. But rarely do any consequences, whether financial or otherwise, flow from 
these accounts. In most countries central bankers can be dismissed only for incapacity or 
gross misconduct and not for incompetence. Walsh (2002) also notes that granting long terms 
of office to central bankers limits the extent to which central bankers can be held accountable. 
From all the arguments that were mentioned in favour and against CBI, it is clear that CBI 
is lacking a solid theoretical background, while the empirical research that supports has 
structural weaknesses. On the contrary there are well-based logical arguments and proofs in 
favour of the view that central banks should be directly controlled from democratically 
elected governments.  
5    Conclusions 
Through an analytical literature review, a primary research about the basic central bank 
characteristics in modern democracies and critical analyses of the central bank ownership and 
                                                 
2 However it must be mentioned that Banaian et al (1998), used principal component analysis and found 
an insignificant and/or a positive rather than negative relationship of the 15 attributes of central bank 
independence that are included in the Cukierman index with mean inflation rates. 
3 Brumm (2011) tested the relationship between inflation and CBI and found that they are endogenously 
determined, while the negative correlation between the two remains robust. 
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independence topics, this research has tried to shed light to the highly important topic of 
central banking. The author, as most individuals, agrees that central banks are necessary and 
their role in every modern economy is vital. But certain characteristics of modern central 
banks create suspicion and concern, especially in the aftermath of the recent financial crisis 
and the manner that it was confronted.  
The first main research question was if central banks should be privately or state owned. 
From the primary research and the literature review on the topic it is concluded that most 
central banks around the world are state-owned. Keeping in mind the central role of these 
institutions for every economy, the impact of their decisions for the general public and the 
power they are granted, there is little space for private ownership and control. Private 
ownership is more likely to create suspicion and possible conflicts of interests rather than 
improve the central bank’s performance. In the small number of countries with privately 
owned central banks, the ownership status should probably be a topic of public debate. 
The second question asked if central banks should operate independently from 
democratically elected governments and if that is the optimal way to provide financial and 
monetary stability and economic growth. Even though the idea of independent central banks 
was quickly adopted by academic and political cycles, it is clearly lacking solid theoretical 
and empirical justification. As Howells and Mariscal (2006, p. 9) aptly put it: “The literature 
that has made central bank independence so fashionable presumes precisely this: that a 
legislative act …carries more credibility than a promise by government to follow a low 
inflation policy”.  
The reality is that for the cost of hypothetical inflation, we are in risk of submitting a 
monopoly of money to a small number of unelected officials with close ties with the banking 
sector. The recent global financial crisis is an example of the cost that societies pay when they 
lack efficient control mechanisms for the financial sector. Monetary policy and financial 
regulation are clearly core government responsibilities and not targets that must be met by an 
independent central bank’s governing board. 
The third and final question is if central banking transparency and accountability are the 
methods for ensuring that a central bank’s decisions will coincide with the will of the general 
public. From the literature review and the analysis of the arguments in favour and against 
central bank independence, it is clear that most central banks were not, are not, and perhaps 
should never be independent from governments. In modern democracies their role is just too 
important to be left in the hands of unelected officials. The various accountability and 
transparency policies that are applied are providing some level of democratic control and are 
certainly steps towards the right direction. However they cannot fully justify this vast transfer 
of responsibility from democratic governments to private individuals. 
The main argument in favour of CBI, which is related with the time consistency problem, 
could be dealt with by an independent authority of experts that will continuously monitor the 
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government’s monetary policy, and not the other way around. Alternatively, if there are 
independent central banks, they should operate, like any other national independent authority, 
in a very strict regulatory framework: clear legislation about its responsibilities, goal setting 
by the government, frequent reporting, strict accountability measures and increased 
transparency rules. 
From the whole analysis it is clear that most modern democracies should reassess the 
notion and substance of central banking and address methods and practices that could 
possibly jeopardize economic development and the effective functioning of democracy in the 
long run. This research is of course limited by the low response rate and from the fact that it 
does not cover all the extensive literature about central banking. However it does point out 
some interesting directions for future research, including public opinions about central bank 
ownership and independence and the relation of CBI with real economic performance and 
social indicators. 
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Appendix. Questionnaire replies 
Central Bank  
Dincer-
Eichengreen 
indep. index, 
2010  
Transparency 
Danmarks 
Nationalbank n/a Reports, Press releases, Statistics, Speeches, Website, Contact 
Swiss National 
Bank n/a 
Reports, Publications, Press releases, Speeches, Interviews, Bulletins, 
Speeches, Contact 
Reserve Bank of 
Australia 0.17 
Consultation with government, Reports, Presentations to parliament, 
Communication program, Media releases, Appearance in committees, Bulletin, 
Minutes, Speeches, Website, Contact 
Oesterreichische 
Nationalbank n/a 
Reports, Audits, Presentation to Financial Committee, Researches, Forecasts, 
Statistics, Website, Contact 
Bank of England 0.23 Reports, Hearings, Minutes, Discussions,  Press releases, Statistics, Speeches, Seminars, Conderences, Website, Contact 
Banco de 
España n/a Reports, Publications, Press Releases, Multimedia, Website, Contact 
Bank of Japan 0.35 Reports, Publications, Statistics, Minutes, Press Conferences, Speeches, Website, Contact 
Federal Reserve 
System  0.18 
Reports, Congress auditions, Minutes, Press releases, Publications, 
Conferences, Speeches, , Website, Contact 
Banca d' Italia n/a Reports, Parliamentary auditions, Publications, Statistics, Lectures, Conferences, Speeches, Press releases, Website, Contact 
Latvijas Banka 0.83 Reports, Publications, Statistics, Multimedia,  Speeches, Website, Contact 
Bank of Greece n/a Reports, Parliament auditions, Publications, Press releases, Statistics, Speeches, Website, Contact 
Bank Indonesia 0.73 Reports,  Publications, Press releases, Minutes, Speeches, Website, Contact 
Bangko Sentral 
ng Pilipinas 0.29 
Reports, Press releases, Highlights of discussions, Letter to president, 
Briefings, Seminars, Conferences, Statistics, Multimedia, Website, Contact 
Croatian 
National Bank 0.73 
Reports, Publications, Bulletin, Presentations to parliament, Statistics, 
Seminars, Minutes, Lectures, Speeches, Conference, Website, Contact 
Central Bank of 
Hungary 0.77 
Reports, Announcements, Report to minister,  Minutes, Statistics, Seminars, 
Press releases, Website, Contact 
National Bank 
of Romania 0.79 
Reports, Press releases, Bulletins, Presentations to parliament, Minutes, 
Statistics, Speeches, Website, Contact 
National Bank 
of Serbia n/a 
Programme, Reports, Gazette, Press releases, Press conferences, Publications, 
Statistics, Social media, Website, Contact 
Central Bank of 
Malaysia 0.49 
Reports, Publications, Press releases, Speeches, Educational programs, 
Multimedia, Website, Contact 
Hong Kong 
Monetary 
Authority 
n/a Reports, Bulletins, Presentations, Meetings,  Statistics, Seminars, Minutes, Speeches, Website, Contact 
